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Abstract--This paper is concerned with the derivation of 
closed-loop Stackelberg (CLS) solutions of a class of 
continuous-time two-player nonzero-sum differential games 
characterized by linear state dynamics and quadratic cost 
functionals. Explicit conditions are obtained for both the 
finite and infinite horizon problems under which the CLS 
solution is a representation of the optimal feedback solution 
of a related team problem which is defined as the joint 
minimization of the leader's cost function. First, a specific 
class of representations is considered which depend linearly 
on the current and initial values of the state, and then the 
results are extended to encompass a more general class of 
linear strategies that also incorporate the whole past trajec- 
tory. The conditions obtained all involve solutions of linear 
matrix equations and are amenable to computational nalysis 
for explicit determination of CLS strategies. 
1. Introduction 
AN APPROPRIATE solution concept for hierarchical multicriteria 
decision problems is the Stackelberg solution concept which 
was first introduced in economics within the context of static 
economic competition (yon Stackelberg, 1934). Its dynamic 
version later entered the control literature through the works 
of Chen and Cruz (1972) and Simaan and Cruz (1973a, b), 
and found applications in nonzero-sum differential games 
where one player has enough ability or power to enforce his 
strategy on the other player(s). Within the context of two- 
player differential games, the more powerful player is called 
the leader and the other one is called the follower. An 
extension is, of course, possible to 'one leader'- 'many 
followers' and even to "many leaders' many followers' 
situations. 
The initial application of the Stackelberg solution concept 
to differential games has been within the framework of the 
open-loop information structure, and the extension to closed- 
loop information structures has remained as a challenge for a . 
long time. The main difficulty arises from the fact that under 
closed-loop information, the reaction set of the follower 
cannot be determined explicitly, even in the case of linear 
quadratic (LQ) problems, thus resulting in a nonclassical 
control problem faced by the leader. One way to circumvent 
this difficulty is to assume specific parametric structures for 
the strategy of the leader, in which case the follower's reaction 
can be explicitly determined, and then the problem faced by 
the leader is to optimize on those parameters subject to the 
constraint imposed by the reaction set of the follower. Such 
an approach has, in fact, been adopted by Medanic (1977), 
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within the context of LQ nonzero-sum two-person differential 
games and under a linear feedback structure for the strategies 
of both players, and the author arrives at a set of 
intercoupled complicated equations in terms of the coefficient 
matrices ought and depending on the probability distribution 
of the initial state. 
Quite recently, a new indirect approach has been proposed 
to obtain the closed-loop Stackelberg (CLS) solution of 
nonzero-sum differential games, which, in essence, relates the 
CLS strategy of the leader to a representation of optimal 
feedback solution of a particular team problem (Ba~ar and 
Selbuz, 1979b). This approach has been carried out by Ba~ar 
and Selbuz (1979b) to obtain the CLS solution of a class of 
two-person nonzero-sum dynamic games described by linear 
difference equations and quadratic cost functionals, yielding 
linear CLS strategies for both the leader and the follower, 
with the former's being of the one-step memory type. Besides, 
the optimal strategies can be obtained recursively. A specific 
example solved in detail by Basar and Selbuz (1979a) clearly 
displays several important features of the new approach 
taken, and properties of the CLS strategies obtained withi-n 
that context. The essentials of this new technique are as 
follows: first the leader's cost function is minimized over the 
controls of the leader and the follower, yielding Optimal 
(team) strategies for both players in feedback form, together 
with an optimal trajectory. But there exist different CL 
representations of the leader's optimal team strategy on this 
optimal trajectory. Then the question is whether there exists 
one particular representation for the leader to which the 
optimal response of the follower (obtained by minimization of 
his own cost function) coincides with his (the follower's) team 
strategy, thus yielding the optimal team trajectory. If it exists, 
such a strategy would clearly be the leaders CLS strategy, 
since it provides the leader with an optimal team cost which 
is the lower bound on the CLS cost. It has been shown in 
Bazar and Selbuz (1979b) that, within the context of the 
specific class of dynamic game problems considered, such an 
approach can effectively be used to obtain the CLS strategy 
of the leader. 
In the present paper, we extend this approach to two- 
person continuous-time linear differential game problems 
under quadratic ost functions for both players, and we treat 
both the finite-horizon and the infinite-horizon cases. The 
specific techniques used here to obtain the CLS solution are 
inherently different from those used by Basar and Selbuz 
(1979b) for the discrete-time version. In the main bulk of the 
paper the class of admissible representations for the leader are 
assumed to depend only on the current value and the initial 
value of the state vector, whereas in the last section an 
extension to more general memory representations is 
discussed. Almost concurrently with this work is the recent 
paper by Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1979), who have also 
utilized the approach of Basar and Selbuz (1979b) in the 
continuous-time setting, to obtain a set of sufficiency 
conditions for the leader to be able to enforce the optimal 
trajectory within the class of linear memory strategies 
described by Lebesgue-Stieltjes measures. Within this general 
setting, the sufficiency conditions obtained by the authors 
are in the form of integro-differential equations, which are 
difficult to manipulate ven in the scalar case. We should also 
mention that the specific techniques used by 
Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1979) to arrive at those 
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sufficiency conditions are inherently different from those 
employed in this paper. 
In the next section, we provide a formulation of the 
continuous-time Stackelberg problem to be considered m the 
paper, and give the optimal feedback solution of the related 
team problem. In Section 3, we obtain conditions (in the form 
of linear matrix differential equations) for a particular 
representation of the leader's team strategy to force the 
follower to the team solution. The obtained CLS strategy of 
the leader depends explicitly on the current and the initial 
values of the state, while that of the follower is in feedback 
form. Section 4 treats the infinite-horizon version of the 
general problem, and obtains explicit and computationally 
attractive expressions. It also includes the Stackelberg 
solution of a nonscalar differential game problem. Section 5 
contains an extension of results of Section 3 to more general 
representations that involve continuous memory, so that the 
leader can have flexibility in his choices. A conclusion section 
ends the paper. 
2. General problem statement and ,solution ol the related team 
problem 
Using the conventional notation for continuous-time 
systems, we let the ew)lution of the state be described by the 
differential equation 
dx  
= A (t )x + Bl (t )u + B2 (t Jv, 
dr 
x(0)=xo, 0<t_< T, 12.1) 
where u{. ) is an r-vector function controlled by Player 1 (the 
leader), v( ' )  is an r'-vector function controlled by Player 2 
(the follower), x( - ) is the state vector of dimension n, A( ' ), 
B~(') and B2(') are matrices of appropriate dimensions and 
with entries continuous on [0, T]. All this information and 
the value of the initial state xo are known to both players. 
The terminal time T will be assumed, for the moment, to be a 
finite number. In Section 4, however, we will also consider the 
infinite-horizon problem. 
The cost functions for Players 1 and 2 are given by J~ and 
J2,  respectively, where 
D¢linition 1 For the differential game formulated above, a 
strategy 7*eF 1 constitutes a closed-h~op Stuckelherg (CLS) 
.strategy for the leader if 
sup Jl[7*.72)_<supJl(;,i.72), V71cl ,, i2.3) 
where  R() '  1 ) denotes the rational reaction set of the follower 
defined by 
Rl ; ' t J= ' ,7~V2: J2 ( ) ' l , ; ' ° )<~J2{; ' , , ' /2 )  , V72c l  21. 
{2.4) 
The CLS cost of the leader is then 
.I* =sup J l(7*,72)=inf sup J1(71,72)- {2.51 
RI ~ I I Rlill 
Furthermore, any strateuy ",* ,* ,* -,* ,2 ~R{~I ) for which J l(~t,,2)='J* 
is known as a CLS strategy for the follower. [7 
Now, as it has been discussed in Section I (and more 
extensively by Ba}ar and Selbuz {1979b) for the discrete-time 
problem), an indirect approach to obtain the CLS solution is 
first to determine an easily computable lower bound on the 
CLS cost J* and then lo seek existence of a strategy for the 
leader, which will force the follower to such a behaviuur that 
the eventual cost incurred to the leader is that lower bound. 
To this end. we first note the natural bound 
'7 J* -> min min .I, 171,/21 = d t (',;1, 721= . , {2.6 } 
[ I , 
obtained by jointly minimizing 31{71,}'2} over  V~ and l" 2, 
which is, in fact, the best the leader can hope to accomplish. 
The RHS of (2.6) defines a team problem that admits a well- 
defined solution, since Jt (71,/2) is a strictly convex functional 
of its arguments. Furthermore, using standard results of LQ 
control theory, its unique solution in feedback form can 
readily be determined to be 
9i{t,x(t))- Rli I(tlBi(t)S[t)x{t h i: 1,2 (2.7) 
1 
J, =~x'(T)Q,t..v[T)+ ~ j Ix'Q,(t)x 
o 
+ u'Ril(t)u + v'Ri2(t 11'I dt 0.2) 
with R l l ( ' )>0,  R22( )>0,  /12( ' )>0,  all other weighting 
matrices being nonnegative definite, and all having entries 
continuous on [0, T]. The symbol ' denotes the transpose 
operation. 
Each player has access to ch)sed-h)op perfect state 
information and can utilize that in the choice of his control. 
We denote typical strategies for the leader and the follower 
by ;'l and ;'2, respectively, whose realizations are denoted 
above by u and it, respectively; that is u(t)=7,(t,x(sj, s<t) 
and c(t)=Tz(t,x(s),s<t). We further assume that ;h and 3'2 
satisfy the standard measurability, continuity and growth 
conditions o that the differential equation admits a unique 
solution on [0, T], for each pair (71,~'2). We denote the space 
of such admissible strategies for Player i by F~, i= 1,2. 
Finally, we denote the value of J~ given by (2.2) for an 
admissible pair of strategies (71,72) by Ji ()'l, ;'2J. 
Within tile framework of this differential game problem, the 
closed-loop Stackelberg (CLS) solution concept can be 
introduced as follows: The leader determines a strategy 
71 eFl  and announces it ahead of time. Then, knowing what 
the leader's trategy (but not the control value) is, the ioltower 
chooses a ";'2cF2 so as to minimize J2(71,72). Slfice this 
choice affects the cost incurred to the leader, the leader has to 
take this into account before announcing his strategy. This 
then leads to the following definition of a CLS strategy for 
the leader, where we also take into consideration the 
possibility that the follower's reaction to every strategy of the 
leader might not be unique. 
with S(-) defined as the unique nonnegative-defmite matrix 
solution of 
,cS--Q~ A'S-SA+S[B1RtI1B]+B2RI21B'2]5 ", 
S('I'): Q~ i2.8) 
where we have suppressed the time dependence of the 
matrices, for ease in notation. The unique trajectory resulting 
from application of strategies (2.7) is 
?It ) - ~{t ,  0)xo  {2.9 ) 
where @It, r)  is the state transition matrix of the system 
~=[A - (B~R~ tlB'~ + BzRi2 ~ B2)S]x. (2.10) 
Let us now consider a subset of F~ consisting of all strategies 
for the leader with open-loop representation identical to 
~'lU,.v(t)), that is, introduce a set ['~ cV  I defined as 
F'~ -I';~ e f t  :7~(t,x(shs<t/ 
- -  R i l l ( t )B ' l ( t )S ( t )~( t ,O) . \o l .  12.111 
Analogously, define a set F 2 c V 2 for the follower: 
['2 = [72 E F2:72(t,.,;(s), s <~ t) 
= -Ri21{t)B2(t)S{t)OP(t,O)x,,',. (2.12) 
Our interest in these sets stems from the following property: 
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Proposition 1 If there exists a strategy ~,,*ei~ such that 
all solutions of the minimization problem 
inf J2()'*,)'2 ) ' (2.13) 
V 2 
lie in i'2, then ~,.* constitutes a CLS strategy for the leader 
and 72 is a CLS strategy for the follower. 
Proof This follows readily, since then the lower bound in 
(2.6) is attained. The reason why we do not allow any 
solution to (2.13) outside ~2, is because then, if the follower 
adopts that particular strategy, the team cost might not be 
attained. [] 
In the remaining sections of the paper we will investigate to 
what extent he hypothesis of Proposition 1 is satisfied for the 
class of LQ differential game problems formulated in this 
section. First, we will restrict ourselves to an even smaller 
subset of i~, comprised of strategies of the form 
~'1 (t, x(t ), x o) = - R111 (t )B' 1 (t )S(t )x(t ) 
+P ' ( t ) [x ( t ) -Y ( t ) ]  (2.14) 
which depend at time t only on x(t) and x 0. Later, in Section 
5, we will extend our approach to encompass a broader class 
of strategies. Throughout he analysis we will suppress the t- 
dependences of all the vectors and matrices involved, 
whenever there is no ambiguity from the context. 
3. Sufficient conditions for the leader to enforce his team 
solution within a specific representation class 
Assuming that the leader chooses a strategy in the form 
(2.14), where P ' ( . )  is an (r×n)-dimensional matrix whose 
entries are continuous functions on [0, T], then the follower's 
reaction will be determined from the solution of the following 
LQ optimal control problem: 
min [~x ' (T)Q2fx(T  ) 
'/2e r2 
T 
+ 2 ~ j" [x'[Q 2 + (P' - R 111 B' l S)'R2, (P' - R ~-,' B', S)} x 
0 
-2x'(P' -R~aIB'~S)'R2~P'£+u'2R22uz]dt]  (3.1) 
subject o 
dx 
dt - (A - B1R ~aI B'I S + B1P ' )x -  B1p'~ + B2u2, 
x(O)=x o (3.2) 
and with 
u2 It) = 72 (t, x(s), s < t). (3.3) 
Now, since (3.1) defines a strictly convex function in u2(.), 
the preceding optimization problem admits a unique open- 
loop solution in F 2 for each fixed matrix function P(.) .  
Hence, for the class of representations (2.14), we can replace 
i~2 in the statement of Proposition 1, with the larger set Fz, 
without any loss of generality. 
A straightforward approach to test the hypothesis of 
Proposition 1, in this case, would be first to obtain the 
solution of the above minimization problem (using any one of 
the available standard techniques), and then to investigate 
existence of a matrix PC') for which the unique open-loop 
representation of the optimal strategy found coincides with 
the unique open-loop strategy in ~'2. But such an approach 
leads to rather cumbersome expressions which are difficult to 
manipulate.* An alternative to this approach is to make use 
*This has actually been the approach taken by 
Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1979) to obtain a set of suf- 
ficient conditions for the desired property to hold true. 
of the sought property of equivalence between the optimal 
trajectory of (3.1) and (3.2) and the optimal trajectory of the 
team problem defined in Section 2, throughout the derivation. 
To this end, we adopt the Hamiltonian approach (whose first 
order conditions are also sufficient since we are dealing with a 
strictly convex LQ problem), and define the Hamiltonian H 
corresponding to (3.1) and (3.2) as 
H=l  x'[Q2 + (P ' -  RI, '  B; S)'R2~ (P ' -  RH' B'1S)} x 
- x'(P' - R ~-11B' 1 S)'R21P',2 + ~u'2 R22u2 
+ It'(A - BI R ~ll B'l S + BI P ' )x -  p'B1p'~ + If B2u2, 
where #( )  denotes the n-dimensional 





= - {Q2 + (P ' -  R;~ 1B'I S)'R21 (P ' -R~I  1 B'I S)}x 
+ (P' - R ~-11 B' 1 S)'R 21 P'x 
- (A -B1RHIB ' IS+BIP ' ) '# ;  
p (T )=Qz Ix (T ) .  
Maximization of H with respect o u 2 yields 
0.5) 
u 2 (t) = - R~21B'21~(t), t ~[0, T], (3.6) 
and this has to be matched, in view of (3.5), with any element 
of t'2, in particular with the open-loop strategy. 
Let us now assume, for the moment, that there exists a 
matrix function P( - ) such that the hypothesis of Proposition 
1 is valid. Then, equating (3.6) with ~2(t,~(t)), we obtain the 
relation 
R221(t)B'z(t)#(t)=R?21(t)B'2(t)S(t).g(t), te[0,  T], 
(3.7) 
and furthermore, since the optimal trajectories of the team 
problem and the present optimal control problem will 
coincide, we can let x ( . )~_£( . )  in (3.5) to yield the 
differential equation 
IJ= { Q2 - (P ' -  R ~' B'~ SO'R2xR,,' B'I S} x 
- (A -B  1R~llB'I S+B1p')'F~; 
p(T)=Q2I~2(T),  (3.8) 
whose solution depends linearly on x(-),  which in turn is 
related to x o through an invertible transformation. Therefore, 
letting #(t )=M(t )£( t )  in (3.8), where M( . )  is an (nxn)  
matrix function whose entries are continuously differentiable 
on [0,7"], we readily obtain the following linear matrix 
differential equation for M to satisfy 
iQl + MF + F 'M + PB ' lM-PR21R~l I  B'IS +Q2 
+ SB1 R~l I R21 R~11 B' 1 S + SB2R121RzzR?21B'2S = 0; 
where 
M(T)=Q2 I, 
F a= A _ (BIR{xI B'I + B2R[2t B'2)S. 
An equivalent relation replacing (3.7) is now 
(3.9) 
(3.1o) 
R;2'(t)B'2(t)M(t)=R[2'(t)B'2(t)S(t),  (3.11) 
and hence, if there exists a P( • ) such that the solution of (3.9) 
satisfies (3.11), the strategy (2.14) with that particular P ( . )  
constitutes a CLS strategy for the leader since it then satisfies 
the hypothesis of Proposition 1. This conclusion is made 
precise in the following Theorem: 
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Condition 1 There exists an (n x r) matrix function P ( . )  
with continuous entries so that the unique solution of the 
linear matrix differential equation (3.9) satisfies the relation 
(3.11), where S>0 is defined as the unique solution of (2.8) 
and the team trajectory ~( - ) is given by (2.9). [] 
Theorem 1 Let Condition 1 be satisfied for a matrix 
function P*( ' ) .  Then, there exists a CLS solution for the 
differential game of Section 2, which is given by 
;,~(t, x(~,), xo ) - [P*'(t ) 
Ri~ j (t)B'~ (t)S(t)]x(t)-P*'(t)£(t), (3.12a) 
7*(t, x(t))= Riz'(t)B'2(t)S(t)x(t), 13.12b) 
and the CLS costs for the leader and the follower are given 
respectively by 
J* = ½x~)S(0)x o, (3.1 3a) 
* ~ -' 0 (3.13b) J2 = ixoM(  )Xo, 
Proof As discussed prior to the statement of the Theorem, 
this result follows readily since (3.12a) satisfies the hypothesis 
of Proposition I under Condition I, in other words, if (3.12a) 
is adopted as a policy by the leader, the follower's unique 
optimal reaction in feedback strategies is the one given by 
(3.12b) which is also the team strategy obtained in Section 2. 
Furthermore, since (3.12a) is a representation of (2.7), the 
trajectory determined by (3.12) is precisely the team trajectory 
2(.) ,  and hence the team cost wilt be equal to CLS cost for 
the leader, which is (3.13a). To verify (3.13b) as the CLS cost 
for the follower, it is sufficient to note that the minimum 
value of the LQ optimal control problem faced by the 
follower is given by ½x'#(0), where # is defined by (3.5), from 
which expression (3.13b) follows by inspection under 
Condition 1. [] 
4. The infinite-horizon problem 
We now consider the closed-loop Stackelberg solution of 
the differential game problem for the case when T~ ;c. For a 
meaningful formulation, we take all the parameters of the 
problem as constants, and further let Qu .=Q2f=0.  Since this 
infinite-horizon problem can be considered as the limiting 
case of the finite-horizon differential game, versions of 
Condition 1 and Theorem 1 can easily be obtained by letting 
the derivative terms vanish in the differential equations for S 
and M, but provided that certain stabilizability conditions are 
satisfied. To this end, we first note that the related team 
problem admits the unique feedback solution 
"~ilx(I))=-R;ilBISx(t:), i=1,2  (4.1) 
with S>0 defined as the unique solution of 
S[BIR~IIB] +B2R~zIB'2]S-SA-A'S-QI =0, (4.2) 
provided that the pair 
[ A, IB~, Bz )~ t4.3) 
is stabilizable,* a condition which we assume to hold a priori. 
Then, the feedback matrix 
F= A_lBIRiI I  B'l + B2R~21B'2)S (4.4) 
is a stable matrix, and the optimal team trajectory satisfies 
the differential equation 
x=F:'2, x (0)=x o. (4.5) 
*Together with R~l, RI2, QI>0, this is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for existence of a unique solution to the 
team problem. If, however, Q1 >0, instead of Q1 >0, the said 
condition is only sufficient. 
The statement of Proposition 1 is equally valid in this case 
with some obvious notational modifications, as well as the 
approach taken in Section 3 to obtain a candidate 
Stackelberg solution for the leader. Hence, adopting the 
representation 
?l(t,x(t),xo)= -Rll lB'lSx(t)+P'[x(t)-x(t)], (4.6) 
for the leader, where P is an (nxr )  matrix yet to be 
determined, we seek to solve the infinite-horizon optimization 
problem faced by the follower. This optimization problem is 
as defined by (3.1) and (3.2) with only Qz I=0 and T=-s .  
Since 2(t) approaches zero exponentially as t~ z,,, a sufficient 
condition for the optimization problem to be meaningful is to 
assume that P can be chosen such that the pair 
~A - BIRi~' B'IS + B~P',B2} 14.7} 
is stabilizable. Let us denote the class of all (n x r) matrices P 
that lead to satisfaction of this condition by ,~. Then the 
problem is to investigate xistence of an element in ~ so that 
the follower's optimal reaction coincides with (4.1) with i -2. 
By going through similar steps as in Section 3, it is now not 
difficult to visualize the following versions of Condition 1 and 
Theorem 1, which require no further justification: 
Condition 2 There exists an element P of ,~ such that (i) if 
)~j denotes any eigenvalue of F and #¢ denotes any eigenvalue 
of F+B~P', ;tj+p~4:0, (ii) the unique solution of the linear 
matrix equation 
MF+F'M+PB]M PR21RHIB'1S+Q2 
+ SBIR11~ R2~RiII B'lS 
+SB2Ri21R22RIzlB'2S=O (4.81 
satisfies the constraint 
RzzI B~M=RI2a B'2S. [] (4.9) 
Theorem 2 Let Condition 2 be satisfied for a specific 
matrix P*. Then, there exists a CLS solution to tile infinite- 
horizon LQ differential game, which is given by 
7*(t,x(t),xo)=[p*-Rl~B'mS]x(t)-P*'x(t) (4.10a) 
7~'(x(t))= R~21B2Sx(t). [] (4.10b) 
A special class of problems of particular interest are those 
with controls of dimension one, in which case considerable 
simplifications result with regard to Condition 2. To 
investigate this somewhat further, let us first note that when 
the control inputs are scalar, by appropriate rescaling of the 
cost functions and by redefining B~, it is always possible to 
take RI~=R~z=R22-1 (recall that these quantities were 
required to be positive). Then, the only weighting term for the 
controls, left as a variable, is Rza which we denote, in this 
case, by d. Under this set-up, Condition 2 becomes equivalent 
to existence of a vector P ' - (P I  ..... p,) so that the solution of 
MF + F'M + PB'I M-dPB~ S +Q2 
+dSB1B'IS+SB2B~S=O 
satisfies the relation 
14.1 la) 
B'2[M S] -0 .  (4.1 lb) 
Defining a new (n×n) matrix Z as M-S,  we now note that 
Z should satisfy the linear matrix equation 
ZF+F'Z+PB'IZ+(I  d) 
x[P-SBI]B' IS+Q2--QI-()  (4.12a) 
together with the relation 
81z-o, 14.12b) 
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and this condition is equivalent o Condition 2(ii) for this 
special version of the problem. It should be noted that 
Condition 20) still ensures existence of a unique solution to 
(5.12a). Let us now consider a specific example to illustrate 
the results of this section. 
Example 1 Consider the infinite-horizon differential game 
of state space dimension 2 and with the following values for 
the parameters used in the general formulation: B'~ = (1, 1 ), B~ 
=(2, 1), R11=R12=R22"=l, R21 =2, 
7] 1] 7] 
To obtain the CL Stackelberg solution of this differential 
game with Player 1 as the leader, we now make direct use of 
Theorem 2 after verifying satisfaction of the stabilizability 
requirement and of Condition 2. To this end, let us first note 
that the pair (A,(B~,B2)) is stabilizable and hence the first 
requirement is satisfied. The matrix S characterizing the team 
solution turns out to be 
and by (4.12b), Z should have the form 
Z=l_2z  1 22 " 
--2z2)" 
Thus, using all these in (4.12a) with d=2, we obtain the 
vector equation 
/ ( ° ) ' 7 (;:): 
7-P2 / \3+p2 
J 
G g 
which should admit a consistent solution by a specific choice 
for the pair {P~,P2}. Condition 2(i) now requires, in the 
present context, the matrix G to be full of full rank, which is 
true if, for example, p~ is not allowed the values -1  and -3 .  
Now, by adding the second column of G on g, we obtain the 
equivalent condition 
rank [G, g~] = 2 
where 
~=( -1 , -3 ,  1,10). 
This condition is satisfied if, and only if, the following two 
equations admit a solution (P~,P2), with p~ ~ -1 ,  -3 :  
_p2+9p l+( l _p~)p2=0 
- 10p2-17p~ +3-  (5+3p~)p2=0. 
If we now solve for P2 from the first equation in terms of pl, 
and then substitute it into the second one, the result is a 
cubic polynomial equation in terms of pl, 
13p 3-15p 2-65pl  +3=0,  
which admits three real roots p*= +x/5, 3/13. The 
corresponding P2 values are p*=-7 .26 ,  -5.26, -0.26, 
respectively, to the nearest three decimal places. All these 
three sets of solutions satisfy the required conditions, and 
thus p*= (p~',p~), when substituted in (4.10a), provides a CLS 
strategy (though nonunique) for the leader. Theorem 2, 
therefore, yields for this differential game problem, the CLS 
solutions 
~/l (t, x, x o ) -  (Pl, P2 - 1 )x(t) - (p*, p*)exp(Ft)x o
7*(x(t)) = - (1, O)x(t) 
where 
and p~', p~ are as given above. 
5. A more general representation 
Heretofore, we have restricted the leader's strategies to 
representations of the functional form (2.14), and have 
obtained sufficient conditions under which he can enforce his 
team solution on the follower. It is possible, however, to 
provide more flexibility for the leader by allowing him a 
representation f his team strategy more general than (2.14). 
In particular, if we replace (2.14) with 
~,h(t,x(s),s< t)= - R[l' B'l Sx(t J+ P'(t ) [x ( t ) -  ~Y(t)] 
+W'( t ) [y ( t ) -y ( t ) ] ,  (5.1) 
where y( . )  is an n-dimensional vector function satisfying the 
differential equation 
~'=Cy+Dx, y(0)=0 (5.2) 
and 9(" ) denotes the solution of (5.2) with x(. ) replaced by 
the optimal team trajectory if(.), then the leader has the 
freedom of choosing the matrix functions W(-), C( ' ) ,  D(') ,  
in addition to P(.  ), which clearly provides him with a greater 
degree of flexibility. 
Now, assuming the leader announces the strategy (5.1) for 
one appropriate dimensional quadruple {P,W,,C,D} with 
continuous entries, the follower's reaction to that can easily 
be determined, and conditions for a new version of 
Proposition 1 (with obvious modifications) to be satisfied can 
be derived by basically following the steps taken in Section 3, 
assuming of course that we are dealing with a finite-horizon 
problem. The Hamiltonian that would replace (3.4), in the 
present context, is 
1 ' 1 1 P H=2x Q2x+I [R l l  BISX+ W' (y -y )  
+ P'(~-x)] 'R21[R[l I  B'I Sx + W' (~-  y) 
+ P'(:~ -x ) ]  + Iu~R22u 2 + )"1 
× [ (A -B1R[ I IB ' lS )x+BIP ' (x -£ )  
+ B1W' (y -~)+ B2u2] + 2'2[Cy + Dx] ' (5.3) 
where 2l(-), 22(. ) denote n-dimensional costate vectors, 
satisfying the differential equations 
)q = -{q2 - (P - SB, R[ ;  )R2, R [ ;  B', S}~ 
- (A - BI R [II B'I S + BI P')'21 
-D'22; )~I(T)=Q2f~(T) (5.4a) 
~2=+WRzlR I I iB ' IS2 -WB' I21-C '22 ;  22(T) =0 
(5.4b) 
where we' have also made use of the sought property that the 
optimal trajectory of this optimization problem coincides with 
the optimal team trajectory, i.e., x( . )~-~(. ) ,  y(.)_-- y(. ). 
Hence, the set of differential equations (5.4) now replace (3.8) 
within the context of the present more general version 
Maximization of H with respect o u z yields 
u 2 (t) = - R]21B~ 21 (t) 
which is sought to be equal to ~2(t,x(t)), i.e. 
R2 z' B'22, (") ~ R[2 i B'2S(" ):~(- ). (5.5) 
Since the solution set of (5.4) depends linearly on Xo, and 
:~(.) is dependent on x o through a linear nonsingular 
transformation, we can easily let 2~ and 22 to be related to 
2(-)  through the linear matrix transformations 2~(t) 
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- A l(t)~.(t), .,;.2(t)= Az(t)x(t), where 
satisfy matrix differential equations 
A~+AIF+F 'A ,+PB] /~ I PR21Ri,tB]S 
+Q2 + SBIRiII RztRHI B]S 
+ SB2R,2 ~R22R,2 IB '2S+D'~,2-0 :  
A,(') and A2( ' )  
A l(T)-- Qej- 
(5.6a) 
k2+ A2F+C'A2+WB' IA  t
WR21RHIB'IS=O; A 2(T ) -0 .  (5.6b) 
Furthermore, in terms of this new notation, (5.5) becomes 
R22tB2/',l(t)=~R121B'2S(t), t ~ [0, T]. (5.7) 
Hence, we immediately have the following versions of 
Condition 1 and Theorem 1, in the present context, which we 
give without proof. 
Condition 3 There exist appropriate dimensional matrix 
functions P(- }, W( • ), C(" ) and D(" ) with continuous entries 
so that the unique solution of the coupled linear matrix 
differential equations (5.6) satisfies the relation (5.7). [] 
Theorem 3 Let Condition 3 be satisfied for matrix 
functions P*( '  ), W*(" ), C*(- ) and D*(" ). Then, there exists 
a CLS solution for the differential game of Section 2, which is 
given by 
~'*(t, v(s), s < t )= [P* ' -  R ~,~ B'~ Six(t) 
-P* 'x( t )+ W*'[y(t ) -y( t ) ]  (5.8a) 
7*(t, x(t)) = - R ~e I B" Sx(t ), (5.8b) 
where y and f respectively satisfy 
S.-C*y+D*x(t) ,  y(0) -0  (5.9a) 
.~-C*~+D*.~,(t), y(0)= 0. (5.9b) 
Furthermore, the CLS costs for the leader and the follower are 
given, respectively, by 
J~ - lzxl)S(OIxo, (5.10a) 
J*-t2xl)At(O)x o. [] (5.10b) 
We should note at this point that the only difference between 
(3.9) and (5.6a) is the additional term D'A 2 appearing in the 
latter, which actually provides the leader with more freedom 
in ensuring satisfaction of relation (5.7). 
6. Conclusion 
We have obtained, in this paper, the closed-loop 
Stackelberg (CLS) solution of an important class of 
continuous-time two player nonzero-sum differential games 
described by linear state equations and quadratic cost 
functionals, and under certain (not totally restrictive) 
conditions on the system parameters. Both the finite- and 
infinite-horizon problems are considered, and in both cases, 
the derived CLS strategies have the important property that 
they generate the same state trajectory as that of a related 
optimal team problem. The objective function of this team 
problem is precisely the cost function of the leader, so that 
the derived CLS solution can also be considered as an 
extreme Pareto-optima[ solution to the leader's advantage. 
In the derivation of the CLS solutions that inherit the 
above property, two different classes of representations have 
been adopted for the leader: (i) linear strategies that depend 
only on the current and initial values of the state, (ii) linear 
strategies that depend on the whole past trajectory. For the 
former class of representations, both the finite and the 
infinite-horizon problems are solved, with conditions of 
existence related to solutions of linear matrix equations. 1:or 
the class of strategies that depend on the whole past 
trajectory, a set of sufficiency conditions that are related to 
the solutions of two linear matrix differential equations arc 
obtained, under which the finite-horizon problem admits a 
CLS solution with the above cited feature. The scalar version 
of the differential game problem of this paper has been 
studied thoroughly in Ba~/ar and Olsder (1979) and it has 
been shown, in that context, that one of the following two 
situations can arise: (a) the differential game admits a CLS 
solution within the prescribed linear class, or (b) there exisl 
only ~:-Stackelberg strategies for the leader, with the 
corresponding sequence of costs converging to the minimum 
value of his cost function. Hence, to seek the ('LS solution of 
differential games within the class of representations of related 
team solutions is a reasonable approach, which is clearly also 
corr()borated by Example 1 of Scctic, n 4. 
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